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CHALLENGING UNJUST CONVICTIONS UNDER SECTION

1983
Leon Friedman*

Perhaps the easiest way to begin my discussion on
challenging unjust convictions is to merely assert that an individual
cannot use § 19831 to challenge unjust convictions and move on to
the next panel. Yet, such challenges do indeed exist, in part, because
of the presence of numerous exceptions.
I.

CHALLENGING UNJUST CONVICTIONS UNDER SECTION
1983: HECK V. HUMPHREY AND ITS PROGENY

Heck v. Humphrey,2 which was decided in 1994, set the
precedent for using § 1983 to challenge unjust convictions.

* Joseph Kushner Distinguished Professor of Civil Liberties Law, Hofstra University School
of Law. A.S., KK.B., Harvard University. Professor Friedman is considered a leading
scholar in the subjects of civil rights, civil procedure, criminal procedure and the First
Amendment. This Article is based on a transcript of remarks from the Practising Law
Institute's Twenty-Third Annual Conference on Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation, in
New York, New York.
42 U.S.C § 1983 (2000) states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
2 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
3 Id. at 486-87 (holding that to recover for an unjust conviction, a plaintiff must prove that
his or her conviction or sentence was reversed in a direct appeal, invalidated by an
authorized state tribunal, expunged by executive order, or "called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus").
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Approximately 1,930 decisions have cited to Heck in the past twelve
years, which includes 140 circuit court decisions.

I did not even

count the district court decisions because such a task would be quite
difficult, given the unwieldy number of decisions.
One may wonder why so many decisions cite to Heck. The
reason, or part of it, is that a large portion of these cases are brought
by prisoners. And prisoners, as we all know, often initiate complaints
or litigation because they are unhappy about their imprisonment. The
problem in a case like Heck, or other cases such as Preiser v.
Rodriguez4 and Edwards v. Balisok,5 is that these decisions held that
a prisoner cannot challenge a prison's disciplinary actions if the result
6
of the challenge may lead to a change in the term of imprisonment.
Thus, because such actions are barred by Heck, the number of
decisions citing to Heck tends to be quite high.
A.

Preiser v. Rodriguez

The first important case in the Heck line of decisions is the
Preiser decision, which held that a prisoner convicted of a crime
simply cannot challenge the conviction in a § 1983 action.7
prisoner's only basis for a challenge was habeas corpus.8

The

The Preiser Court explained that a prisoner cannot challenge
his conviction or sentence in a § 1983 suit because any challenge
4 411 U.S. 475 (1973).

' 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
6 See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; Preiser,411 U.S. at 499; Edwards, 520 U.S. at 648.
7 Preiser,411 U.S. at 500.
8 Id. The Court held that "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of
his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to
immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a
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would assume that there was something wrong with the conviction or
sentence-which must remain unchallenged because a subsequent
challenge is barred by res judicata. 9 A prisoner cannot challenge the
conviction or sentence because, based on res judicata, a court already
decided he was guilty and that decision is on the books. 1 Hence,
because there is a final judgment and sentence, a prisoner cannot
bring a subsequent suit that challenges the judgment in the first
action. Therefore, the unjust conviction analysis begins with Preiser,
which seems to be a plausible decision.
B.

Heck v. Humphrey

In Heck, however, unlike Preiser,the plaintiffs merely sought
damages and were not trying to upset their convictions.

In other

words, the decision's result would not release the plaintiffs from jail.
Instead, the result of the case would give the plaintiffs money based
upon the claim that the conviction was improper.
The Court held that a plaintiff could ordinarily file a § 1983
action for damages without having to exhaust all state remedies.11
write of habeas corpus." Id.

9 Id. at 497-98. The Court explained that while res judicata principles are not entirely
applicable to a habeas corpus proceeding, they are applicable to § 1983 actions. Id. at 497.
Furthermore, that if res judicata did not apply to § 1983 actions:

[T]here would be an inevitable incentive for a state prisoner to proceed
at once in federal court by way of civil rights action, lest he lose his right

to do so. This would have the unfortunate dual effect of denying the
state prison administration and the state courts the opportunity to correct
the errors committed in the State's own prisoners, and of isolating those
bodies from an understanding of and hospitality to the federal claim of
state prisoners in situations such as those before us.
Id.
10 Id. at 498-99; see infra note 88 and accompanying text (defining res judicata); see also
infra Part II.C.
" Heck, 512 U.S. at 480-81.
The Court explained that exhaustion is generally a
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Yet, a § 1983 action that challenges the legality of an underlying
conviction cannot be asserted "unless and until the conviction or
sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant
of a writ of habeas corpus."' 12 Therefore, a prisoner cannot file a §
1983 claim for damages that challenges the validity of the conviction
or imprisonment because any assertion that the arrest was improper,
as is required in common law tort actions for false arrest or
conviction, necessarily encompasses a challenge to the conviction
itself.' 3

Again, while it has nothing to do with exhaustion, it is

merely that the prisoner has a predicate to his or her § 1983 action
4
that is barred by res judicata, namely the judgment of conviction. 1
C.

Edwards v. Balisok

The Court forwarded Heck's holding into the prison discipline
area in Balisok.15 First, it is important to understand that if a prisoner
is allowed to attack the prison procedure in a disciplinary hearing,
according to the policy of the prison, a prisoner may gain or lose
good time credits. A loss of good time credits changes a prisoner's
status and prohibits the prisoner from receiving an early release from
jail. The Court held that the same principles announced in Heck and

prerequisite for a federal habeas corpus action, and is not a prerequisite in a § 1983 suit. Id.
at 480-81.
12 Id. at 489.

IId. at 486-87. The court discussed the common law torts of malicious prosecution and
false arrest, finding that the principle that "civil tort actions are not the appropriate vehicles
to challenge the validity of outstanding criminal judgments" should apply to § 1983 suits,
which require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement. Id. at
486.
14 Id. at 487.
"5 Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648.
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Preiser apply to the prison discipline area.' 6

The action that a

prisoner brings to attack a prison procedure assumes the invalidity of
some judicial-type proceeding, which has not been undermined prior
to the prisoner bringing the instant suit.' 7 Thus, the holding in
Edwards is similar to exhaustion cases under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act ("PLRA").18 There is some predicate barring a prisoner
from bringing a case, some element in the claim that a prisoner
cannot challenge.
D.

Wilkinson v. Dotson

19
Conversely, the Supreme Court held in Wilkinson v. Dotson

that if a prisoner simply attacks the prison's procedures and the relief
requested will not change the prisoner's status or it will not lead to
less time served, then that challenge is permissible.20 The Supreme
Court held that a Heck problem did not exist because the prisoners
had not challenged their sentence and would serve the same amount
of time, even with a favorable result. 2'

Thus, if a prisoner simply

16 Id. at 643-44, 648.
17 Id. at 646. In Balisok, the prisoner claimed that "he was completely denied the
opportunity to put a defense on through specifically identified witnesses who possessed
exculpatory evidence." Id.
18 Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2000). See e.g., Powe v. Ennis, 177
F.3d 393, 394 (5th Cir. 1999) ("(A] prisoner's administrative remedies are deemed
exhausted when a valid grievance has been filed and the state's time for responding thereto
has expired."); Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
PLRA required defendant to exhaust all available remedies prior to initiating a federal
action).
'9 544 U.S. 74 (2005).
20 Id. at 82. The Court explained that the prisoners in Wilkinson were not seeking to

secure an earlier release from prison or a change in their status. Id. Instead, "[sluccess for
Dotson ... means at most new eligibility review, which at most will speed considerationof
a new parole application. Success for Johnson means at most a new parole hearing at which
... authorities may ... decline to shorten his prison term." Id.
21 Id.
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ends up serving the same time and his challenge does not alter the
period that he is going to serve, then the prisoner can bring an action
challenging parole procedures as long as it will not change his status.
E.

Hill v. McDonough

Last year the Supreme Court added to the previously
discussed rulings in the case of Hill v. McDonough.22

In the Hill

case, a death penalty decision, a prisoner challenged the specific
method used to lethally inject prisoners. The Court explained that the
prisoner was not challenging the death penalty because the complaint
only sought to force the respondents to find some other method to
execute Hill.23 Therefore, the action was viewed as a challenge to the
three-drug protocol to bring about the lethal injection and not the
24
lethal injection itself.
Hill built on a case from the previous year, Nelson v.
Cambell,25 where the challenge was to the method of accessing the
vein of the individual. Yet, Nelson and Hill simply challenged the
method used to administer the death penalty, therefore, the Court held
that the challenges in both cases did not create a Heck problem. 26
22 126 S. Ct. 2096 (2006).
23

Id. at 2102.

24

Id. The three drug protocol involved is administered as follows: first, sodium pentothal

is used to anesthetize; second, pancuronium bromide is used to paralyze the muscles; and,
third, potassium is used to stop the heart of the inmate. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme
Court Hears Case Involving Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at Al.
25 541 U.S. 637 (2004); see also Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2101 (citing Nelson, 541 U.S. at 644).
26 Hill, 126 S. Ct. at 2103-04. The Hill Court explained that "the injunction Hill seeks
would not necessarily foreclose the State from implementing the lethal injection sentence
under present law, and thus it could not be said that the suit seeks to establish, 'the
unlawfulness [that] would render a conviction or sentence invalid.' "Id. (quoting Heck, 512
U.S. at 486). In Nelson, the Court also held that the challenge to Alabama's injection
procedure did not pose a Heck problem, given that the relief sought did not challenge the
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F.

Peralta v. Vasquez

Peralta v. Vasquez,

27

a recent case decided by the Second

Circuit, took the analysis one step further.

Peralta involved a

prisoner's challenge to a prison disciplinary proceeding, but part of
the challenge would have changed the prisoner's status because it
would have taken away good time credits. Yet, the challenge brought
by the prisoner only generally challenged prison procedures.

The

prisoner argued that it was a bad procedure that led to the termination
of his good time credits.

The question became, if there are two

sanctions in a case, one that affected the duration of the custody and
the other that affected the conditions of the confinement, can a
prisoner maintain the challenges? The Second Circuit, in a decision
by Judge Calabresi, held, " '[I]n mixed sanction cases,' a prisoner
can,

without

proceedings .

demonstrating
.

that

the

challenged

disciplinary

. have been invalidated, proceed separately with a §

1983 action aimed at the sanctions or procedures that affected the
conditions of his confinement.,

28

Suppose a prisoner asserts the following: "I am not altering, I
am not asking for a change in my good time credits; I just want the
procedures that were followed to be changed."

According to the

Second Circuit, a prisoner can challenge the procedures used and can
only bring "an action if he agrees to abandon forever any ...

claims

he has with respect to the sanctions that affected the length of his

sentence itself. Nelson, 541 U.S. at 645-46.
27 467 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2006).
28 Id. at 100.
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Essentially, it is not enough for a prisoner to say,

"Okay, I am not going to challenge the length of my imprisonment, I
will do that in the future after I made some internal administrative
change." The Second Circuit held that a prisoner must "abandon...
any claims he may have with respect to the duration of his
confinement that arise out of the proceeding he is attacking in his
30
current § 1983 suit."

Thus, the Second Circuit found a prisoner must give up his
claim because the court does not want to have to hear a prisoner's
claims piecemeal, through multiple lawsuits. The court, therefore,
decided to make a distinction between a challenge that affects the
length of your internment and a suit that simply challenges a
procedure that led to the imprisonment without in any way affecting
that result. 3'

While this case is somewhat strange, the court's

rationale seems to be that it does not want a bifurcated case.
In conclusion, Heck and its progeny are very important
because they close the door on § 1983 cases.

Even if you think

something about your conviction is unfair, you cannot use § 1983 to
challenge the unjust conviction, but must use habeas corpus instead.
Habeas corpus, however, is particularly difficult because the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 32 ("AEDPA") has
numerous requirements, such as exhaustion and a very short statute
of limitations, which essentially prohibits a prisoner from initiating a
29 Id.

30 Id.at 104.
31 Id.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 and 42 U.S.C.).
32
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lawsuit immediately after conviction.33

Additionally, there is

deference to state fact-finding and state legal conclusions.34 Further,
under the AEDPA, the plaintiff must show that there was an
unreasonable application of the law. 35

The AEDPA's numerous

provisions make it very difficult for a prisoner to challenge his or her
conviction.
Naturally, a prisoner wants to go straight into court after
being convicted, so that he or she can remedy the circumstances.
Yet, the AEDPA prohibits such action. Instead, a prisoner must go
through the state post conviction, exhaust everything, and face all the
difficulties of AEDPA, which is one of the reasons why prisoners
come into federal court with a § 1983 suit. In turn, the federal courts
dismiss such actions, and this is why Heck has been cited 1,930
times.
II.

USING SECTION

1983

TO CHALLENGE UNJUST ARRESTS,

EXCESSIVE FORCE, SEARCHES, AND CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT

There are some cases where a person can bring a § 1983
action, such as when a prisoner challenges the conditions of
confinement.3 6 Prisoners can bring a challenge to certain conditions,
such as receiving improper medical treatment or inadequate meals-

" 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000) (imposing a one-year limitation).
34 Id. § 2254 (imposing a burden on the applicant to rebut "the presumption of correctness
by clear and convincing evidence").
35 Id.
36 "Section 1983 liability for alleged violations of detainee's rights can be premised on
two theories: (1) that the conditions of confinement violated the detainee's rights or (2) that
episodic acts or omissions of officials violated those rights." Hebert v. Maxwell, m 0530929, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 1160, at **10-11 (5th Cir. filed Jan. 19, 2007).
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whatever aspect of confinement the prisoners dislike. Yet, the PLRA
creates an enormous number of hoops a prisoner must jump through
and over to bring suit. 37 Under the PLRA, a prisoner must, among

other things, exhaust all administrative remedies. 38 Again, there are a
whole series of procedures a prisoner must follow, making it difficult
to bring suit, but Heck does not preclude the prisoner's PLRA
lawsuit.
Numerous cases deal with the conditions of arrest.39 When a
person is arrested, can the prisoner bring a false arrest claim while he
or she is incarcerated and awaiting trial? Courts have held that the
answer is no, such action is clearly barred because if a person is
falsely arrested due to a lack of probable cause, the issue cannot be
addressed until a jury renders a guilty verdict. 40 Arguably, one has

3 42 U.S.C. § 1997e et. seq.
38 Id. § 1997e(a).
39 See, e.g., Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding a former
prisoner's § 1983 actions for false arrest and false imprisonment should be denied but
remanding the prisoner's malicious prosecution claim); Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440
F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2006) (denying the plaintiffs § 1983 action for false arrest due to statute
of limitations); Chachere v. Houston Police Dep't, H-05-3187, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
84631, at **9-11 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2006) (stating that if the Court were to grant the
plaintiff damages for the alleged false arrest while the case is pending, such a ruling would
necessarily implicate the validity of a future conviction stemming from the alleged false
arrest).
40 See, e.g., Covington v. City of New York, 171 F.3d 117, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that false arrest claims accrue at the time of arrest, but if the § 1983 lawsuit's success would
imply the conviction's invalidity, it does not accrue if the potential for a verdict in the
underlying criminal prosecution exists); Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 1996)
(finding that Heck prevents the accrual of § 1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of
convictions on pending criminal charges). The Covington court explained that:
So long as the criminal case remained pending, however, a parallel §
1983 case based upon a false arrest and wrongful search claim would
create the distinct possibility of an inconsistent result if the prosecutor's
evidence was dependent upon a valid arrest. That is the reason why the
§ 1983 cause of action could not accrue during the pendency of the
criminal case.
Covington, 171 F.3d at 124.
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nothing to do with the other. Logically, that is true, but courts do not
look at it that way.
How about excessive force?

Suppose a prisoner asserts,

"Yes, I committed the crime and I was convicted but when the police
arrested me, they really abused me." Is there any bar to bringing an
excessive force case in a § 1983 action if the conviction has been
affirmed and not been set aside?

And the answer is:

sometimes,

generally it depends on why an individual was arrested.4 1

If a

prisoner was arrested for resisting arrest, then arguing that the police
used excessive force is somehow a challenge to the conviction for
resisting arrest and, therefore, the prisoner cannot sue.42

The suit is

barred until the conviction is reversed, which may then result in a
statute of limitations problem.4 3
If an individual is arrested for jaywalking, resists arrest, and
the police shoot the person in the head, arguably an excessive force
claim exists. The courts, however, consider that if a person resists
arrest, the resistance thus provides the officer with a privilege to use
reasonable force to overcome the arrestee's resistance. 44

While it

seems like an individual shot in the head for a jaywalking violation

41

See, e.g., Washington v. Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 1997) ("[A]

wrongful arrest claim, like many Fourth Amendment claims, does not inevitably undermine
a conviction because a plaintiff can wage a successful wrongful arrest claim and still have a
perfectly valid conviction." (citing Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052, 1056 (7th Cir. 1996))).
42 Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 n.6.
43 See Covington, 171 F.3d at 119-20.
44 See, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (explaining that an officer in a
§ 1983 action for excessive force is protected by qualified immunity when she "reasonably
misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted"); Payne v. Pauley, 337
F.3d 767, 778 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that a police officer's conduct is constitutional if,
based on the totality of the circumstances, he does not use more force than is necessary to
effectuate the arrest).
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may have an excessive force claim, excessive force cases typically
discuss all of the facts surrounding the resistance of the arrest, 45 and
subsequently assert that the police are allowed to use whatever force
is reasonably sufficient to overcome the arrestee.4 6
A.

Requirements for Challenging Unjust Arrests,
Searches or Excessive Force

PROF. SCHWARTZ:

It is often difficult to determine when a

challenge to an arrest, a search, or excessive force attacks the validity
of the conviction. When is a challenge to excessive force a claim that
necessarily implicates the validity of the conviction? In cases where
the plaintiff is challenging an arrest or force, the question always
comes down to whether the challenge necessarily implicates the
validity of the conviction.4 7

We know what question to ask.

The

problem is answering the question. For example, when there is an
excessive force claim or there is a challenge to an arrest or a search, it
is often not clear whether it is correct to say that if the plaintiff
succeeds, the success will necessarily lead to the overturning of the
conviction.
PROF. FRIEDMAN:

A few recent decisions discuss the

existence of a challenge for resisting arrest, such as VanGilder v.
45 See, e.g., Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 195-97 (detailing how the accused ran through the

neighbors' yards, jumped into a vehicle, and ignored the officer's commands); Payne, 337
F.3d at 775-76 (detailing how the defendant cursed at the police, incited onlookers, entered a
squad car against an officer's instructions, and moved a vehicle that was part of the crime
scene against an officer's instructions).
46 See, e.g., Payne, 337 F.3d at 778 ("A police officer's use of force is unconstitutional if,
'judging from the totality of the circumstances at the time of arrest, the officer used greater
force than was reasonably necessary to make the arrest.' " (citation omitted)); Brosseau, 543
U.S. at 200-01.
41 Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
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Baker48 and Ballard v. Burton.49 To answer Professor Schwartz's
question, courts will typically determine what the individual must
show in order to succeed in the specific § 1983. For instance, in a
malicious prosecution case an individual must show the action
terminated in favor of the accused.5 °

In a false arrest case, the

arrestee must show there was no probable cause for the arrest. 5' In an
excessive force claim, the officer would have to show that he acted
52
reasonably in affecting the arrest.
So what you have to do is look at the elements of the claim
and decide, is there any element of the claim that you cannot prove so
long as the conviction is still on the books? I think that is the way the
courts review such claims. The courts always break it down into
those elements and see what happens.
B.

Statute of Limitations Problems

The big issue in a § 1983 challenge by prisoners is when does
the statute of limitations begin to run? Many cases discuss this issue
in the context of the respective § 1983 challenge at issue, such as
challenges to a false arrest, excessive

force,

and malicious

prosecution.53
" 435 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that an inmate could challenge the lawfulness
of a search even if it revealed evidence that was used to convict "because success on the
merits would not necessarily imply that the plaintiffs conviction was unlawful" (quotations
omitted)).
4' 444 F.3d 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that a § 1983 claim can depend on whether a
favorable judgment for the plaintiff implies his conviction is invalid).
50 Heck, 512 U.S. at 484.
51 Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1998).
52 Vasquez v. City of Jersey City, No. 03-CV-5369(JLL), 2006 WL 1098171, at **1, 3
(D.N.J. March 31, 2006).
53 Notably, on February 21, 2007, after the date of the Practising Law Institute's program,
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False Arrest: Wallace v. City of Chigaco

A statute of limitations issue arose in Wallace v. City of
Chicago,54 when a prisoner brought a § 1983 action for damages
arising from a false arrest. Wallace presented the following problem.
Andre Wallace was arrested, put in jail, and convicted of murder.
After the conviction, Wallace asserted that his original arrest was
unconstitutional and subsequently, the conviction was overturned.
Thus, any Heck problems that might have existed before the
conviction was overturned disappeared. Next, Wallace filed a § 1983
action for damages arising from his false arrest. The dilemma was,
however, that it had been six years since the arrest and five years
since the conviction. The district court granted summary judgment
against Wallace, holding that his false arrest claim was barred by the
statute of limitations, which was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals. 55 Wallace requested a rehearing en banc, which
the full circuit court denied, though Judge Posner wrote a brilliant
dissent.56
The Wallace case illustrates the current problem many
individuals endure.

When does the claim accrue with respect to

the United States Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations for a § 1983 Fourth
Amendment challenge to a warrantless arrest accrues when legal process is issued-when a
plaintiff has " ' a complete and present cause of action.' " Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091,
1095 (Feb. 21, 2007) (quoting Bay Area Landry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v.
Ferber Corp. at Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)). For instance, in Wallace, the Court held
that Wallace's false arrest claim accrued when he first appeared before the examining
magistrate and was bound over for trial on his underlying felony charge. Id. at 1096.
Further, the Court explained that the accrual date for a § 1983 claim is a matter of federal
law. Id. at 1095.
" Wallace, 440 F.3d 421.
15 Id. at 423.
56 Id. at 430 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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excessive force or false arrest?

Malicious prosecution is easier to

establish because an element of malicious prosecution provides that a
convicted defendant's claim only starts to run when the conviction
has been overturned.5 7 But what about false arrest?
It is perfectly plausible to say, as Judge Posner did in his
dissent in the Wallace case, that a plaintiff could avoid dismissal by
utilizing the doctrine of equitable tolling which allows "a plaintiff to
delay suing beyond the statutory limitations period if he is unable
despite all due diligence to sue within the period; but as soon as he is
able to sue he must.

' 58

Yet, under Heck, you could not bring the

false arrest case. Hence, the dilemma is as follows.
Court: "Hey, wait a minute. You should have brought
your claim a year after your arrest."
Plaintiff: "I could not bring suit a year after my arrest
because under Heck, I was precluded from doing so."
Court: "Well, it is too bad. Your statute of limitations
has run."

The Supreme Court has now affirmed the Seventh Circuit decision,
holding that false arrest claims accrue at the time of arrest.5 9
2.

Excessive Force: Swiecicki v. Delgado

Aside from Wallace, there is another statute of limitations
case from the Sixth Circuit, Swiecicki v. Delgado, 6 ° which was an

" Heck, 512 U.S. at 484-87 (analogizing a § 1983 action to the common law tort of
malicious prosecution which requires that a criminal conviction be terminated in favor of the
accused, through direct appeal or at the initial trial, prior to bringing a claim for damages).
58 Wallace, 440 F.3d at 431 (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
59 Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 1100 (2007).
60 463 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2006).
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In Swiecicki, the issue was when does that

statute of limitations start to run? If Heck precludes either a false
arrest or excessive force case, how can a court say, "Well, you cannot
bring that case while your conviction is around," and once the
conviction is vacated the court now tells you, "Oh, sorry, you should
have brought the case we told you that you could not bring earlier."
What are you supposed to do under those circumstances?
The panel in Swiecicki held that a claim of excessive force
accrues after the conviction was reversed because he was resisting
arrest. 6 '

The court explained that statute of limitations for an

excessive force claim under § 1983 begins to run after the underlying
conviction is reversed or expunged because "a cause of action under
§ 1983 would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiffs
underlying criminal conviction.,

62

Judge Posner, however, disagreed

with that approach. 63 He took each of the cases the majority cited
and switched them from one side to the other, finding that the score
was not five to seven for the panel's approach, but was twelve to
nothing, against the panel's approach. 64
61

Id. at 495 ("The statute of limitations ... did not begin to run until Swiecicki's state-

court conviction was overturned.").
62 Id. at 493 (citing Shamaeizadeh v. Cunigan, 182 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 1999)
(emphasizing the facts' temporal component)).
63 See Wallace, 440 F.3d at 430-34 (Posner, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 432. Judge Posner explained that the panel cited five cases in adopting its rule
that false arrest claims accrue at the time of the arrest. Id. (citing Nieves v. McSweeney, 241
F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2001); Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553 (10th Cir.
1999); Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998); Simmons v. O'Brien,
77 F.3d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1996); Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252 (1 1th Cir. 1995)). Further,
there were seven cases in conflict with the panels' ruling. Id. at 433 (citing Guager v.
Hendle, 349 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 2003); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir.
2000); Shamaeizadeh, 182 F.3d at 399; Covington, 171 F.3d at 124; Cabrera v. City of
Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380 (9th Cir. 1998); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85
F.3d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1996); Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995)). Id. at
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Given these decisions, it seems like what a prisoner could do
is file a claim and then, the first time the prisoner shows up before the
judge at a Rule 1665 conference he would say, "Your Honor, put this
on the suspense calendar for the next ten years while I challenge my
conviction."
3.

Excessive Force: McCann v. Neilsen

PROF. BLUM: Recently, the Seventh Circuit decided a case
in this area, McCann v. Neilsen.66 The plaintiff in McCann was a
prisoner who brought a § 1983 claim for damages for a false arrest
and excessive force claim.

The court said the plaintiff was not

denying his assault of a deputy as obstructive conduct.67 Instead, the
plaintiff alleged that "regardless of what he may have done, the
deputy's use of deadly force as a response was not reasonable.

68

The McCann court held the question was not whether the plaintiff
here "could have drafted a complaint that steers clear of Heck (he
could have), but whether he did.",69 The survival of many of these §
1983 challenges will depend upon good craftsmanship of the

434. In his dissent, Posner stated:
The panel is right that there are two groups of cases.

But they are

consistent. One holds that a Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim accrues
at the time of arrest, assuming the conviction does not depend on the
evidence alleged to have been illegally seized. The other holds that the

claim does not accrue then if the conviction does depend on that
evidence. I count 12 cases to 0 against the panel's approach.
Id.

65 FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
66 McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that the claimant's

claim of excessive force during his arrest was not barred by Heck).
67 Id. at 622.
68 Id. at 622-23.
69 Id. at 622.
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complaint and how the claim is phrased.7 °
Again, consider the jaywalker hypothetical discussed by
Professor Friedman.

Suppose the jaywalker resisted arrest and

argued that the officer used deadly force.

The jaywalker could

further argue that he should be able to bring an excessive force claim
even if the arrest was legitimate. Hence, the argument becomes, even
if the jaywalker was resisting arrest, he can still bring a claim
asserting that the police officer should not have shot him without
upsetting the validity of the jaywalker's conviction. Under McCann,
the court should let him proceed.
4.

Malicious Prosecution

PROF. FRIEDMAN: Suppose an individual is convicted of a
crime and the conviction is reversed.

After the conviction is

reversed, the individual begins suing everyone in sight because of his
unfair conviction. Who is "everyone in sight?" You would want to
sue the officers who arrested you, as well as the prosecutor who
brought the Grand Jury indictment and prosecuted the case that led to
your conviction. Thus, one should sue the prosecutor for malicious
prosecution as well.
First, you must prove malicious prosecution, which is a fourpart test under the common law.71 If you establish a constitutional
70 Id. (explaining that the critical issue is whether factual allegations in the complaint
"necessarily imply the invalidity of his convictions" (quotations and citation omitted)).
71 See Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 761 N.E.2d 560, 564 (N.Y. 2001).

Under

common law, malicious prosecution requires that the plaintiff establish: 1) "that a criminal
proceeding was commenced"; 2) that the criminal proceeding "terminated in favor of the
accused"; 3) that the proceeding lacked probable cause; and 4) "that the proceeding was
brought out of actual malice." Id. (citing Broughton v. State of New York, 335 N.E.2d 310,
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malicious prosecution,
you cannot prevail.

you will prevail. If not, Heck applies and

If an individual can establish the elements of

constitutional malicious prosecution he will want to sue every person
who put him in jail, including the police officers and prosecutor,
since he was wrongly incarcerated.

There may, however, be a

problem in suing the prosecutor because absolute immunity may
apply. 73 Therefore, if absolute immunity applies, you can only sue
the police officers.
The requirements for common law malicious prosecution are:
1) there was initiation of a criminal prosecution; 2) it terminated in
the plaintiffs favor; 3) there was no probable cause; and 4) there was
actual malice in the defendant's action.74 If the officer can prove that
he or she had probable cause, then the officer cannot be held liable
for malicious prosecution.7 5 Also, liability cannot be imposed on an
officer in a malicious prosecution action if the prosecutor made an
independent judgment to continue with the charges. 76
314 (N.Y. 1975)).
72 See Rohman v. New York City Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating
that in addition to the four New York common law elements of malicious prosecution, a
plaintiff alleging constitutional malicious prosecution under § 1983 must assert a "sufficient
post-arraignment liberty restraint to implicate the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights").
Therefore, a plaintiff asserting a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 must show a
"denial of liberty consistent" with the notion of a "seizure." Id.
73 A prosecutor is absolutely immune from a malicious prosecution action for the decision
to prosecute a case. Hartman v. Moore, 126 S.Ct. 1695, 1704 (2006) (citing Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)). However, a prosecutor may still be liable for any
"conduct taken in an investigatory role" or the offering of "legal advice to police regarding
interrogations." Id. at 1705 n.8 (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274-76
(1993); Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,492-95 (1991)).
74 See supra note 71.
75 See Gisondi v. Town of Harrison, 528 N.E.2d 157, 159 (N.Y. 1988) (stating that a
plaintiff may not prevail against the officers on a malicious prosecution action if the police
had probable cause to suspect the plaintiff committed the alleged crime in the first place).
76 See Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999). "It is well settled
that the chain of causation between a police officer's unlawful arrest and a subsequent
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In New York, in terms of common law malicious prosecution,
there is a law that provides if the Grand Jury indicts, the indictment
creates a presumption of probable cause." This is a presumption that
can be overcome. 78 For instance, the Second Circuit in McClellan v.
Smith, 79 held that "a Grand Jury indictment gives rise to a

presumption that probable cause" existed and, therefore, invalidates a
malicious prosecution claim. 80

Another way of overcoming the

presumption is by bringing a Brady violation,8 ' where one could
argue that the prosecutor destroyed exculpatory evidence or the
prosecutor failed to present exculpatory evidence. 82
In addition to the four elements of common law malicious
prosecution,

suppose

the prosecution

was terminated by

adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ("ACD").83

an

Is that a

conviction and incarceration is broken by the intervening exercise of independent judgment."
Id. Intervening judgment may include a prosecutor's decision, or even the decisions of a
grand jury, judge or jury. See Barts v. Joyner, 865 F.2d 1187, 1195 (11th Cir. 1989);
Smiddy v. Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266-68 (9th Cir. 1981). This principle is true "in the
absence of evidence that the police officer misled or pressured the official who could be
expected to exercise independent judgment." Townes, 176 F.3d at 147.
77 In New York, once a suspect has been indicted by a Grand Jury, the indictment creates
a presumption of probable cause. Colon v. City of New York, 455 N.E.2d 1248, 1250 (N.Y.
1983).
78 Id. at 1250-51. The court explained that the presumption of probable cause may be
overcome by "establishing that the police witnesses have not made a complete and full
statement of facts either to the Grand Jury or to the District Attorney, that they have
misrepresented or falsified evidence, or that they have withheld evidence or otherwise acted
in bad faith." Id.
79 McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2006) (involving a plaintiff who
brought a § 1983 suit for "false arrest, malicious prosecution, unlawful search and seizure,
and unlawful imprisonment").
80 Id. at 145.

81 A Brady violation is a due process violation that occurs when the prosecution
suppresses "evidence favorable to an accused ... where the evidence is material either to
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See also infra Part III (discussing Brady violations).
82 See infra Part III.
83 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 2006).
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termination in his favor? Unfortunately, the answer is no. Is it a
termination for administrative reasons or something? It is not; there
either has to be an acquittal, a reversal of the conviction or the
indictment has to be dismissed.

But in simply dismissing it, an

adjournment in contemplation of dismissal is not termination in the
favor of the defendant. Lack of probable cause and some kind of
actual malice is a necessary prerequisite.84
For constitutional malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
show something more-a loss of liberty.85 If nothing bad happened
as a result of the prosecution, the individual is arrested, released on
his own recognizance, and the prosecution begins.

Where is the

constitutional violation? A loss of liberty is a necessary prerequisite.
86 or Fifth Amendment 87
There must be a Fourth Amendment
violation. Thus, to bring a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim a
plaintiff must have suffered a deprivation of liberty.88

84 See Martinez, 761 N.E.2d at 564.
85 See supra note 72.
86 U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:

87

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. V states:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time or War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
88 See supra note 72.
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Res Judicata Problems

Suppose you challenge an excessive search and a magistrate
judge or a court finds that there was probable cause. Although the
parties are not the same, res judicata 89 problems may arise because in
the conviction you were a defendant being prosecuted by the state,
whereas in your suit against the officer, you are a plaintiff and the
officer is the defendant. While there are some claim preclusion and
collateral estoppel 9° problems that occur, ultimately, res judicata
problems are at the core of the suit. You always have to question
what it was the court decided that is still on the books and has not
been undone.
PROF. SCHWARTZ:

Here, we are dealing with state

criminal proceedings, so there are potential preclusion problems,
abstention

problems,

and

potentially

some

Rooker-Feldman9 1

89 Res judicata is "an issue that has been definitively settled by judicial decision" or "an

affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same
claim, or any other claim arising from the same transaction or series of transactions and that
could have been-but was not-raised in the first suit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 608 (2d

pocket ed. 2001).
90 Collateral estoppel is defined as "an affirmative defense barring a party from
relitigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier action, even if the second
action differs significantly from the first one." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 108 (2d pocket ed.

2001).
91 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
In Rooker, The plaintiffs sought to have the
judgment of an Indiana circuit court "declared null and void." Rooker, 263 U.S. at 414. The
court stated that:
If the constitutional questions stated in the bill actually arose in the
cause, it was the province and duty of the state courts to decide them;
and their decision, whether right or wrong, was an exercise of
jurisdiction. If the decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment
void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate
and timely appellate proceeding. Unless and until so reversed or
modified, it would be an effective and conclusive adjudication.
Id. at 415. In Feldman, the Supreme Court had to determine "what authority the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for
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problems. 92 The Heck problem, however, seems to be the biggest
problem of all. It could be an insurmountable problem because, as
you said, it is not an exhaustion rule. It is a rule that really becomes
an element of the plaintiffs claim. If the claim comes within Heck,
the plaintiffs claim is not cognizable until the conviction is
overturned, someplace and somehow. It could be overturned in a
habeas proceeding, but it could also be overturned on appeal in state
93
court or the person could receive clemency.
Ill.

BRADY CLAIMS UNDER SECTION

PROF. FRIEDMAN:

1983

Let me now discuss Brady v.

Maryland94 and then absolute immunity. Under the Brady rule, a
criminal defendant's due process rights are violated if the prosecution
suppresses exculpatory evidence requested by the accused. 95 Thus, a
discussion of § 1983 decisions with Brady implications is particularly
important.

the District of Columbia Circuit have to review decisions of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals in bar admission matters." Id. at 463. The Supreme Court held that a district
court cannot review a final decision of the highest court in that jurisdiction. Id. at 486.
92 See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005). "Rooker
and Feldman exhibit the limited circumstances in which this Court's appellate jurisdiction
over state-court judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, precludes a United States district court from
exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to
adjudicate under a congressional grant of authority ....Id.
9' Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. "[I]n order to recover damages for an unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment .. .a § 1983 plaintiff must prove [that their conviction was]
reversed on direct appeal ...
94 Brady, 373 U.S. at 83.
95 Id. at 87. The Court held that regardless of whether the prosecution is acting in good or
bad faith, the purposeful suppression of exculpatory evidence which is material to guilt or
punishment of the defendant, such as a co-conspirator's confession of murder, is a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
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A.

Yarris v. County of Delaware

Suppose you file a § 1983 action because the Grand Jury
indicted you, you were convicted, and your conviction was
overturned

because

the

prosecutor

or

the

police

destroyed

exculpatory evidence. There is a recent case discussing this issue
called Yarris v. County of Delaware.96 Yarris involved the deliberate
destruction of exculpatory evidence.

Deliberately destroying

exculpatory evidence is not covered by absolute prosecutorial
immunity.

Prosecutors are immune for bringing the indictment,

presenting evidence in court, and a few other actions. 97 Destroying
evidence, however, before it gets to court is not covered by any of the
elements of prosecutorial immunity. 98 The Yarris case is a very good
opinion because the court found that, even though the prosecution did
not destroy the evidence, it knowingly withheld the evidence. 99 The
Third Circuit explained that withholding information, just like
destroying information, is a Brady violation, and such conduct is not
covered by absolute immunity. 100

96 465 F.3d 129, 131-32 (3d Cir. 2006).

After serving twenty-two years on death row,

Nicholas Yarris's conviction was overturned after he was given access to exculpatory
evidence which he claimed the Delaware County prosecutors and detectives purposefully
obscured and destroyed evidence in an attempt to frame him for the rape and murder of the
victim, Linda Mae Craig. Id.
9' Id. at 140-41 (stating that the courts apply a two-step inquiry, finding: 1) "whether the
facts alleged show that the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right";
and 2) whether that violated constitutional or statutory right was" 'clearly established' at the
time the violation occurred").
98 See Id. at 136-37 (stating that prosecutors are not afforded immunity from a lawsuit
arising from the prosecutor's alleged destruction of exculpatory evidence since this action is
not related to the prosecutor's prosecutorial function).
99 See id.
1oo Id. at 138 (stating that since the prosecutors did not show that their denial of Yarris's
DNA tests requests occurred during an ongoing adversarial proceeding, or " 'for the
initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings,' " the prosecutors will not be entitled
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B.

Section 1983 Brady Cases Based On Negligence

I have litigated § 1983 Brady claims, and am working on one
now.'0l

While a Brady claim could be based upon negligence, a due

process violation cannot be based upon negligence. 102 How do we
reconcile that? The case I am currently involved with is of public
record and is out of Brooklyn, so I am happy to discuss it. In my
case, the defendant asked for the criminal record of any witnesses
against him, as part of discovery. The prosecution responded to the
discovery demands without providing any information.

The only

witness against the defendant was the complaining witness, who said,
"He attacked me and robbed me."

Eventually, we found the

complaining witness's criminal record.

Judge Nina Gershon

appointed me in the federal habeas corpus action, which we were
granted, and now we are suing in the Court of Claims for the
prosecution's failure to present the criminal record.
We are suing the City of New York because when I asked the
prosecutor, "How come you did not produce the criminal record," he
said, "In over twenty-four years as a prosecutor, I and my office, we
never produce the criminal record of a witness unless we know or
have some reason to believe he has a criminal record." I said, "But it
was asked for."

He said, "Well, we interpret the CPL section as

to absolute immunity (quoting Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993))).
101Turner v. New York, 825 N.Y.S.2d 904, 907 (Ct. Cl. 2006). A decision was rendered
in the Turner case approximately six weeks after this speech was delivered. See infra note

118 and accompanying text.

102 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) overruling Parratt v. Taylor 451 U.S.

527 (1981). The Daniels Court held that "the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended
loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Id.
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requiring us to give it only if we have prior knowledge that he has a
criminal record." Hence, in the instant case we are arguing that this
is a policy of the City of New York and there is no absolute
immunity, because it is the policy of the District Attorney's office.
Unlike negligence, a policy of not looking seems to take it one step
further, and cities do not have absolute immunity in that area. If the
conduct is not considered the City's policy, absolute immunity may
be a problem for a simple negligence claim. 103
One could ask, could it be that in a criminal prosecution or
habeas proceeding a Brady violation could be based upon negligence,
but in a § 1983 case the Brady violation would have to show more
than negligence?

That, somehow, seems illogical.

But, if the

Supreme Court holds in the § 1983 context that a due process claim
cannot be based upon negligent conduct, how does one square all
this? Well, there are a lot of Brady cases where the Court says that
the prosecutor, even though he did not know exculpatory evidence
existed, should have known that there was something pointing in the
direction of exculpatory evidence.1t4 The minute you get to that
point, it becomes more than negligence, which is what most of these
Brady § 1983 actions discuss. The easy cases are when the evidence
is there but the prosecutor destroys or knows about it and does not do
anything. Such actions, without a doubt, are both a basis for a Brady
103 See Buckley, 509

U.S. at 273 ("A prosecutor's administrative duties and those

investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's preparation for the initiation of a
prosecution or for judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.").
104 See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280-81 (1999) (holding that prosecutors have a
duty to learn of the existence of any evidence known to other officials that is favorable to the
defense); see also Kyles v. Whitley 514 U.S. 419, 438-39 (1995) (holding that a prosecutor
has the duty to establish procedures and regulations for inter-department communications so
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violation and basis for a later § 1983 action, and there is no absolute
05
immunity under those circumstances.
Aside from a § 1983 action, there are other problems that may
arise, such as statute of limitations and absolute immunity problems.
Eventually, you could bring an action in the Court of Claims under a
New York statute, the Court of Claims Act, Section 8B, the state
unjust imprisonment law. 10 6

Under this statute, "[a]ny person

convicted and subsequently imprisoned for one or more felonies or
misdemeanors against the state which he did not commit may ...
present a claim for damages against the state."' 1 7 In the case I have
now, I brought a Court of Claims action against the State of New
York and a § 1983 action against the City of New York based on the
same events. There is no reason why you cannot do that.
With the Court of Claims action, a plaintiff must show that,
"he has been convicted of one or more felonies or misdemeanors
against the state and

subsequently

sentenced to a term of

8
imprisonment, and has served all or any part of the sentence.' ' 0o

Therefore, the claimant must provide documentary evidence, in order
to prove his claim.' 09 Second, the claimant must show the "judgment
of conviction was reversed or vacated, and the accusatory instrument
dismissed or, if a new trial was ordered, either he was found not
as to insure that all relevant information and evidence in a case is properly disclosed).
105 See Jovanovic v. City of New York, 04 Civ. 8437, 2006 WL 2411541, at *16
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2006) (advising no absolute immunity for prosecutorial activities that
fall outside of scope of duties).
106 N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (McKinney 2006) (governing claims for unjust convictions and
imprisonment).
107 Id. § 8-b(2).
108 Id. § 8-b(3)(a).
109

Id.
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guilty at the new trial or he was not retried and the accusatory
instrument [was] dismissed .... ,"110 Hence, the claimant must show
that the judgment was reversed and the indictment was dismissed. If
the claimant was convicted, served time, and the judgment of
conviction was reversed, it would not be enough to establish a claim
because the claimant would still be available and can be re-indicted.
Finally, you must prove that the indictment was dismissed on
particular grounds, including "paragraph (a), (b), (c), (e) or (g) of
subdivision one of section 440.10 of the criminal procedure law.""'
Specifically, these dismissal grounds include

fraud,

lack of

jurisdiction, false evidence, or the defendant could not understand or
participate in the proceedings because of a mental defect.

2

Notably,

the Act does not permit a person to bring a claim when the indictment
is dismissed on section 440.10's constitutional grounds, found in (d)
and (f) of 440.10.13 Hence, the State of New York's statutes provide
that if your conviction was reversed on newly discovered evidence,
fraud or some local problem, the court will provide relief. However,
if the conviction was reversed due to a Brady violation, the court will
not provide relief. 114 Unfortunately, the courts, particularly the Court
of Claims, are very strict about these requirements because if one
reads section 440.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law and all of its
subdivisions, one would see that the omitted subdivisions are the

110 Id. § 8-b(3)(b)(ii)
III N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(3)(b)(ii)(A).
112 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (McKinney 2006).

"3 See N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(3)(b)(ii)(A).
114 See Turner, 825 N.Y.S.2d at
907.
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constitutional claims." 5
Why should there be a difference?

If your conviction was

reversed and indictment dismissed, why should it matter if it was a
federal constitutional claim or state constitutional claim? The State
of New York, in its infinite wisdom, has said it is not interested in
giving relief to defendants whose claims were dismissed on federal
constitutional claims.1

6

Therefore, in my case, I had to argue that

the Brady claim is fraud within the meaning of one of the subsections
of New York's Criminal Procedure Law. 1 7

A case from the

Appellate Division, Second Department, supported this claim." 8
Currently, I am waiting for the Court of Claims to render its
decision. 119

115 Compare N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b (requiring the accusatory instrument to be dismissed

based on a paragraph of subdivision one of section 440.10 of the criminal procedure law)
with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 440.10 (stating grounds to vacate judgments).
116 See Turner, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
117 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10(1)(c) which provides that a defendant may move to
vacate a judgment on the ground that: "[m]aterial evidence adduced at trial resulting in the
judgment was false and was, prior to the entry of the judgment known by the prosecutor...
to be false."
118 People v. Thomas, 641 N.Y.S.2d 48, 50 (App. Div. 1996).
119 The Court of Claims issued a decision on December 5, 2006. See Turner, 825
N.Y.S.2d at 907. The court held that Turner could not receive relief under N.Y. CT. CL. ACT
§ 8-b because the Brady violation for the prosecution's failure to turn over impeachment
evidence did not fall under any of the paragraphs in N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 440.10. Id. Yet, the
court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment finding that:
Paragraph c of § 440.10.1 is more promising from claimant's vantage,
although limited on its terms to evidence that was known to be false.
With that said, claimant cites persuasive precedent that paragraph c
covers the situation when the falsity of the evidence should have been
known by the prosecutor, and therefore the paragraph c predicate is
satisfied here.

